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is found in the ATUS data. We suggest that nonconvexities in the enjoyment of leisure time may 
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Understanding how changes in programs such as social security and medicare aﬀect
life cycle labor supply in general, and retirement behavior in particular, is central
to assessing the eﬀects of these changes on allocations, welfare, and government
ﬁnances. Accurate assessments require a model of retirement that captures the
key economic forces that lead to retirement. To date there is relatively little work
that aims to isolate these key forces. Much recent work that models retirement
as an optimal solution to an individual’s lifetime labor supply problem assumes
that workers face a discrete choice between working full time or not working
at all. If the hours associated with full-time work are suﬃciently great, these
models can generate retirement.1 The question as to why workers must choose
between a ﬁxed number of hours versus zero hours is often left unanswered in
these models. Typically the authors appeal to the presence of nonconvexities in
the production process, associated with workers getting to work and getting set
up in a job, coordination issues among workers, etc..... The objective of this
paper is to provide a more careful assessment of the extent to which the class
of models featuring production based nonconvexities provide a suﬃcient basis for
understanding retirement as part of an optimal labor supply choice. Assessing the
empirical adequacy of these models has important implications for policy analysis,
since these models give rise to large changes in retirement behavior in response to
changes in eﬀective marginal tax rates.
1Examples of retirement analyses that adopt this approach are Rust and Phelan (1997),
Laitner and Silverman (2005) and Ljungqvist and Sargent (2006, 2009). See also Hurd (1996).
1We carry out two exercises. The ﬁrst exercise considers a standard life cycle
model of labor supply extended to allow for nonconvexities in production. These
nonconvexities are assumed to take two forms, either as a ﬁxed time cost or as a
mapping from hours of work to output (or earnings) per hour that is increasing
instead of constant. We compute how large the required nonconvexities must be in
order to generate retirement. An important ﬁnding is that the degree of noncon-
vexity required increases sharply as the intertemporal elasticity of substitution for
labor decreases. Our calculations suggest a tension between understanding retire-
ment and understanding changes in hours worked and wages for prime aged males.
In particular, if the elasticity of hours worked with respect to wage changes is .50
or lower, the required nonconvexities seem unreasonably large given current esti-
mates. Either the production based nonconvexities are not suﬃcient as a model of
retirement, or previous estimates of labor supply elasticities for prime aged males
are far too low. More deﬁnitive conclusions would require better measurement.
In the second exercise we extend our model to allow for home production.
Recent work by Aguiar and Hurst (2005) emphasizes the potential importance of
home production in the context of retirement. We ﬁnd that allowing for home
production reduces the degree of nonconvexities required to generate retirement.
A closely related and robust implication of this model is that time devoted to home
production should increase when a worker retires. Moreover, the magnitude of this
increase is very large, with time devoted to home production at least doubling.
We then examine the ATUS data to assess the extent of the increase in time
devoted to home production when workers retire. Although this data set does
2not allow us to observe what happens to the home production time of speciﬁc
i n d i v i d u a l sa st h e yr e t i r e ,w ec a ne x a m i ne what happens to the home production
t i m eo fag r o u po fw o r k e r sa sm o r eo ft h e mb e c o m er e t i r e d .T h i sd a t ar e v e a l sn o
evidence of such large changes in home production time.
While our analysis does not rule out nonconvexities in production as being an
important element in modeling retirement, we believe that it does suggest that this
feature alone is not adequate. Uncovering the quantitatively important additional
elements is an important topic for future research. Our analysis suggests that
nonconvexities in preferences for leisure that take the form of higher marginal
utility of leisure when not working in the market is a promising candidate to
pursue.
An outline of the paper follows. In Section 2 we describe the standard life cycle
model without any nonconvexities and discuss why this model does not provide a
very satisfactory foundation for understanding the general phenomenon of retire-
ment. Section 3 examines the standard model extended to include nonconvexities
in production and characterizes the degree of nonconvexities required as a func-
tion of the intertemporal elasticity of substitution for labor. Section 4 extends this
analysis by allowing for home production, and Section 5 analyzes time use data
from the ATUS. Section 6 concludes and discusses avenues for future research.
2. Retirement in the Standard Life Cycle Model
In this section we consider a standard life cycle model of labor supply, by which we
mean an individual who maximizes a time separable and strictly concave utility
3function subject to a convex budget set. We show why it is very diﬃcult for this
model to generate retirement when standard functional forms are used. While
this result is probably not surprising to anyone familiar with these models, it is
useful to consider the issue of retirement in this model since it allows us to focus
on a key tension that will also be present in more complex settings considered
later. Before proceeding with the analysis it is important to clarify what we mean
by retirement. We use this term to describe the situation in which an individual
chooses a large, abrupt and persistent decrease in their hours of work following
a lengthy period of full time work. The most extreme form of this phenomenon
is the case in which a worker who has worked full time for thirty or more years
chooses to move from full time market work in one period to no market work
in all subsequent periods. In reality retirement may be more nuanced than this,
with an individual ﬁr s tm o v i n gf r o mf u l lt i m et op a r tt i m eo ro c c a s i o n a lw o r k ,
or moving back and forth between no work and part time work. The key feature
for our purposes is that for almost all workers who eventually withdraw from
the labor force, retirement does not represent a smooth and gradual reduction
of working time from full time work to withdrawal from the labor market. For
ease of exposition, in what follows we will focus almost exclusively on the extreme
form of retirement, where a worker moves from full time work to no work. As we
will see, it is this type of transition that will be the most diﬃcult to account for,
making it an appropriate focus of our analysis.
The standard life cycle model necessarily generates a motive to smooth con-
sumption and leisure over time. Movements in relative prices can induce individ-
4uals to choose proﬁles in which consumption and leisure (and hence work hours)
change over time, but in the face of constant prices, and assuming that the inter-
est rate exactly oﬀsets the agent’s discounting, the individual will choose constant
sequences for consumption, leisure and work hours. Viewed from the perspective
of this standard model, retirement is a puzzling phenomenon, since it represents
anything but a smooth proﬁle for leisure and work.
To facilitate discussion and make the analysis more precise, it is useful to
consider a speciﬁc model, purposefully simpliﬁed so as to make the main points
more transparent. We consider the utility maximization problem of a ﬁnitely
lived individual who faces markets for labor and consumption, and is allowed to
borrow and lend freely. For now we assume that there are no policies in place that
involve taxes or transfers, either explicitly or implicitly. That is, there is no social
security and there is no private pension plan. Let ct and ht denote consumption
and hours of work at age t, and normalize the total time endowment to equal
one each period, so that leisure at age t is given by 1 − ht. We assume that the
individual has preferences described by:
T X
t=0
[log(ct)+αtv(1 − ht)] (2.1)
where T is the length of life, assumed to be known with certainty. The utility
function is separable both across time and across consumption and leisure at
a point in time. The choice of logct as the utility from consumption implies
oﬀsetting income and substitution eﬀects, and allows the model to be consistent
w i t ht h ef a c tt h a th o u r sw o r k e dh a v ec h a n g e dr e l a t i v e l yl i t t l eo v e rt i m ed e s p i t e
5large changes in the real wage. The function v is assumed to be twice continuously
diﬀerentiable, strictly increasing, strictly concave and have inﬁnite derivative at
0.T h ep a r a m e t e rαt is included to allow for the possibility that the marginal rate
of substitution between consumption and leisure changes with age. To simplify
exposition we have assumed that the individual does not discount the future, but
will also assume that the interest rate is zero.2 The present value budget equation






wtht + Y (2.2)
where Y is the present value of non-labor income for the individual.
Letting μ be the Lagrange multiplier on the budget equation and assuming an
interior solution, the ﬁrst order condition for ht is:
αtv
0(1 − ht)=μwt (2.3)
Assuming that the solution for ht is interior, the optimal solution for ht+1 is also









2Alternatively, we could assume that the individual discounts at a positive rate but that the
interest rate is positive and perfectly oﬀsets this discounting. All of our analysis would carry over
to this case, but the algebra is somewhat simpler in the zero discounting case. More generally,
we could assume that the interest rate and discount factor are not perfectly oﬀsetting. This
induces slopes to the life cycle proﬁles for hours of work and consumption. While there is some
empirical support for the presence of these eﬀects they are not central to the issues we focus on
here, and so in the interest of simplicity we abstract from them.
6Otherwise, the optimal solution is ht+1 =0 . Our focus is to understand how to
account for retirement, as deﬁn e da b o v e ,i nt h i sf r a m e w o r k . T h a ti s ,a s s u m i n g
that ht is a number corresponding to full time work, how would this framework









If v0(1) = 0 then ht+1 =0if and only if wt+1 =0 .B u ti fv0(1) > 0 it is possible
that ht > 0,a n dht+1 =0even with wt+1 > 0.
A simple calculation is informative to provide a quantitative perspective on








The parameter γ denotes the intertemporal elasticity of substitution for leisure.
There is of course an extensive literature that has estimated this value, largely
focusing on the labor supply behavior of prime aged males. In connecting with
the empirical literature it is preferable to consider the intertemporal substitution
elasticity for labor rather than for leisure. The implied intertemporal elasticity
of substitution for labor is diﬀerent by a factor of (1 − h)/h. In what follows we
will use the abbreviation IES to always refer to the elasticity for labor,w h i c h
as just noted is in general not equal to γ. There is a voluminous literature that
has estimated the IES using variation in hours and wages over the life cycle.
Early examples include Ghez and Becker (1975), MaCurdy (1981), and Heckman
7and MaCurdy (1980). The early literature found relatively small estimates for
males, on the order of .3 or less, but much larger values for women. (See Pencavel
(1986) for a survey of early work.) Subsequent work, including recent papers by
Kimball and Shapiro (2003), Pistaferri (2003) and Domeij and Floden (2006) have
reﬁned these estimates in various ways, and found larger estimates, in the range
of .7−1.0 for males. (See Hall (2007) for a critical survey of the recent literature.)
In a model that assumed human capital accumulation, Imai and Keane (2004)
found an IES that exceeds 3. Wallenius (2007) argues that this estimate is likely
to be biased upward, and that adding human capital accumulation does not lead
to estimates of the IES that are much greater than 1.0.3
The ﬁrst property that we highlight is a connection between the value of the
IES and the diﬃculty in accounting for retirement. This connection is intuitive.
As noted above, the concavity of v(1 − h) generates a motive to smooth leisure
over time, and the lower the value of the IES, the greater is this motive. Retire-
ment constitutes a dramatic departure from smoothness in the leisure proﬁle, and
the greater the desire for smoothness, the more diﬃcult it is to account for this




wt in equation (2.5) by Rt+1, which can be interpreted as the return
to work in period t +1relative to period t. Equation (2.5) tells us the highest
value of Rt+1 consistent with ht+1 =0given a value of γ and a value of ht.( T h e
parameter A does not appear in this expression.) Assuming a weekly endowment
of discretionary time equal to 100 hours, and that a full time worker devotes 45
3Although we do not consider human capital accumulation in our analysis, Wallenius (2009)
contains some results about the degree of nonconvexities required in that setting.
8hours to market work (including commuting), we have ht = .45. Table 1 gives the
maximum value of Rt+1 that is consistent with inducing pure retirement at age
t +1 .
Table 1
Value of Rt+1 to Induce Retirement
IES=2.0 IES=1.0 IES=.75 IES=.50 IES=.25 IES=.10 IES=.05
.61 .48 .38 .23 .05 .001 .000
The values in the table are revealing. Even with a very large value of the
IES,s a ye q u a lt o2, one would still require a drop of almost 40% in the return to
work between consecutive years to generate retirement. If one focuses on values
of the IES that are commonly used in the literature, such as those that are .25
and below, the message is that one needs almost a 100% drop in the return to
work in order to generate retirement. Even for values that are at the upper end of
estimates for males, such as .75 and 1.00, one still needs the return to work to drop
by more than 50% between consecutive years. The basic message is clear—in this
framework, the only way that one can generate retirement is by assuming dramatic
decreases in wages or dramatic increases in the disutility of working precisely at the
time of retirement. It is important to note that the above analysis has abstracted
from uncertainty. While allowing shocks to w, α,o rY changes the analysis
somewhat, the basic message is that only large shocks to these values can induce
retirement. While it is undoubtedly true that some individuals experience shocks
to market opportunities, wealth, and/or health that might rationalize retirement
9i nt h i sc o n t e x t ,t h ea v a i l a b l ee v i d e n c ed o e sn o ts u p p o r tt h i sa st h ep r i m ec a u s e
of retirement (see, e.g., Blau and Shvydko (2007)). Put somewhat diﬀerently,
although shocks may alter an individual’s plans for retirement, they do not seem
to be the underlying explanation for why individuals plan to retire in the ﬁrst
place.
Although we abstracted from social security and pension programs, the previ-
ous analysis can also be used to gauge how large the change in eﬀective tax rates
associated with these features would need to be in order to induce retirement. In
particular, assuming no change in the return to work, i.e., constant wages and
disutility of working, Table 1 tells us the required magnitude of the increase in
either the implicit or explicit eﬀective tax rate on earnings to induce retirement.
Once again, the message is that these values are extremely large.4 One issue
to note regarding implicit tax rates associated with private pension plans is that
these rates are speciﬁc to the job and so are typically not relevant if the individual
considers working for a diﬀerent employer. In this case the relevant calculation
would be the value of Rt+1 based on the other job opportunities for this individual.
The above calculations were based on the assumption that the individual moves
from full-time work to no work at all. How are these values aﬀected by someone
who moves from full-time work to part time work? Or by assuming that someone
moves from part-time work to pure retirement? Tables 2 and 3 show the results,
using h = .20 to reﬂe c tp a r tt i m ew o r k .
4While typically not the case in the US, in other countries individuals can ﬁnd themselves in
as i t u a t i o nw h e r et h e yf a c ed r a m a t i ci n c r e a s e si ne ﬀective tax rates from one year to the next.
In particular, systems in which one must retire in order to collect social security beneﬁts can
induce large changes in eﬀective tax rates at the normal retirement age.
10Table 2
Value of Rt+1 to Induce Transition from Full-Time to Part-Time
IES=2.0 IES=1.0 IES=.75 IES=.50 IES=.25 IES=.10 IES=.05
.80 .63 .54 .40 .16 .01 .000
Table 3
Value of Rt+1 to Induce Retirement from Part-Time
IES=2.0 IES=1.0 IES=.75 IES=.50 IES=.25 IES=.10 IES=.05
.88 .76 .70 .58 .34 .07 .01
Comparing Table 2 with Table 1 we see that the required values of Rt+1 are
not as small, but the fact remains that these represent dramatic changes in either
preferences or opportunities between consecutive years, even for values of the IES
on the high end. A similar message applies to the results in Table 3. That is,
inducing pure retirement even for an individual who is currently working part-time
still requires a dramatic change in the economic returns to work.
The simple conclusion that we want to emphasize from the above analysis is
that it is very diﬃcult to reconcile retirement with the standard model of life cycle
labor supply. While this statement seems to apply to all reasonable values of the
IES, we also want to note that the lower the IES t h em o r ed i ﬃcult it becomes
to account for retirement in this framework.
One of the key motivations for developing a model of retirement is to under-
stand how changes in eﬀective tax rates associated with changes in social security
or medicare will inﬂuence retirement behavior. While the standard life cycle model
11does not seem to oﬀer a promising theory of retirement, it is interesting to note
one implication of this framework. Loosely speaking, retirement in the above
model occurs only as a result of a very large change in the return to work at the
individual level. In such a setting it is likely that small changes in the eﬀective
return to work associated with small changes in the provisions of social security
will have no eﬀect on retirement. Put somewhat diﬀerently, the calculations de-
scribed above suggest that marginal changes in the return to work have virtually
no impact on the decision to retire.
3. Nonconvexities as a Source of Retirement
The analysis in the previous section illustrated the diﬃculty in generating re-
tirement in a model with a strictly concave time separable utility function and a
convex budget set. An obvious alternative is to relax one of these two assumptions
so as to generate a nonconvexity in the consumer’s optimization problem. Because
nonconvexities can lead to discontinuities in the decision rule for hours, this al-
ternative would seem to overcome the key problem encountered in the previous
section.5 A sn o t e di nt h ei n t r o d u c t i o n ,m u c hr e c e n tw o r ko nr e t i r e m e n ta s s u m e s
that budget sets are nonconvex, implicitly because of some underlying noncon-
vexities in production. In this section we describe two variations of a model that
features nonconvexities in production. While it is true that this model diminishes
the tension that we found in the standard life cycle model, we show that the same
5Cogan (1981) is a classic reference for empirical work on the implications of ﬁxed costs,
though he did not focus on retirement.
12tension is very much present. Speciﬁcally, it remains true that the smaller the
IES,t h em o r ed i ﬃcult it is to generate retirement, in the sense that the required
degree of underlying nonconvexity is larger.
3.1. Fixed Time Costs
We begin with a version of the model recently put forth by Prescott et al (2009).
T h ea n a l y s i si sg r e a t l ys i m p l i ﬁed by assuming a continuous time framework. Nor-
malizing the length of life to 1, preferences are now given by:
Z 1
0
[log(c(t)) + α(t)v(1 − h(t))]dt (3.1)
We consider a nonconvexity that takes the form of a ﬁxed time cost associated
with work, which we denote by ¯ h. If an individual gives up h(t) units of leisure
at time t this will lead to max{0,h(t) − ¯ h} units of labor that can be sold in the
labor market. Letting w(t) denote the wage at time t, the present value budget






w(t)max[0,h(t) − ¯ h]dt + Y (3.2)
Whereas in the previous section one required changes in at least one of α(t) or
w(t) to generate retirement, with ﬁxed costs one can generate retirement without
any variation in these factors. In order to focus on the forces associated with the
nonconvexity it is convenient to initially assume that α(t)=α and w(t)=w for
all t. We will return to consider the more general case later in this section. With
13w and α constant over time, and the interest rate and discount factor perfectly
oﬀsetting each other, the optimal timing of work for the individual is indetermi-
nate. That is, the individual could choose to do all of the work at the beginning
of life, all at the end of life, or all in the middle, etc..... As such, the model may
not appear to be a good model of retirement per se. However, this is an artifact
of the extreme but useful assumption that there is no change in the return to
work over time. If, for example, there is even an arbitrarily small positive slope to
α(t), or negative slope to w(t) (even if only at later ages), then the indeterminacy
would vanish. So while we will work with a speciﬁcation in which the timing of
work is indeterminate, we will focus on the solution in which work occurs at the
beginning of life, followed by retirement.
Independently of the optimal labor supply decision, the optimal consumption
decision for this individual is to smooth consumption perfectly.6 The optimal
solution for the hours proﬁle can take one of two forms. The ﬁrst corresponds to
a solution in which it is optimal for the individual to have positive hours in all
periods. By symmetry, the solution in this case will entail a constant amount of
work at each time t. This case applies if the nonconvexity is not suﬃciently large
to overcome the forces that favor smooth leisure. The second and more interesting
case is one in which the individual chooses to work at some but not all dates.7
6Later in the paper we discuss how the model can address the documented drop in consump-
tion at retirement. The model could also be extended in diﬀerent ways to generate a hump-shape
in consumption during working life, but because this does not appear to be central to the issue
of generating retirement, we do our analysis in the simpler speciﬁcation.
7To be more precise we are interested in the case where the individual chooses positive hours
for a positive measure of time but strictly less than measure 1. In our discussion we will ignore
the issues associated with deviations on sets of measure zero.
14O n c ea g a i nb ys y m m e t r y ,t h ei n d i v i d u a lw i l lw o r kt h es a m ea m o u n to ft i m ei n
all periods with positive hours. If an individual works for measure e periods and
gives up h>¯ h units of leisure at each date, he or she will have a present value of
income equal to:
e(h − ¯ h)+Y (3.3)
We can thus write the utility maximization problem as:
max
e,h
log[e(h − ¯ h)w + Y ]+ev(1 − h)+( 1− e)v(1) (3.4)
Our main interest is to determine the conditions necessary for an interior solution
for e, since this corresponds to there being retirement. Assuming interior solutions
for both e and h we obtain the following two ﬁrst order conditions:
(h − ¯ h)w
e(h − ¯ h)w + Y
= v(1) − v(1 − h) (3.5)
w
e(h − ¯ h)w + Y
= v
0(1 − h) (3.6)
Divide these two equations by each other to obtain:
h − ¯ h =
v(1) − v(1 − h)
v0(1 − h)
(3.7)
This equation is similar in spirit to equation (2.5) that we derived in the previous
section to characterize the conditions necessary to generate retirement at a given


















If we choose a value of γ and specify the level of work during working years, h,t h i s
expression gives the value of ¯ h that is required for the optimal solution to display
both the level of work h while working and retirement. Note that the solution
for ¯ h is independent of the age at which retirement occurs. That is, subject to
requiring that the optimal solution entails working hours of h when working, the
size of the ﬁxed cost that is required to generate retirement is independent of
whether one wants the worker to retire at age 40 or age 65. Conditional upon an
interior solution for e and the level of h, the length of working life is determined
b yt h ev a l u e so fA,a n dY/w.
Proceeding as before, we consider the same range of values for the IES as
in the previous section, and once again consider the case where h is equal to .45
while working. Table 4 provides the results.
16Table 4
Value of ¯ h Required for Retirement
IES=2.0 IES=1.0 IES=.75 IES=.50 IES=.25 IES=.10 IES=.05
.08 .14 .18 .23 .32 .40 .43
One interpretation of the ﬁxed cost is that it represents commuting costs.
Estimates of average commuting times would suggest a value of ¯ h equal to around
.05. From this perspective all of the above values would seem high, with the
possible exception of the IES =2 .0 case. However, there are several issues that
should be noted in the context of interpreting ¯ h as commuting costs. First, it
is not clear that average commuting costs are the appropriate measure to use in
this calculation. We are not aware of any evidence to suggest that retirement
does not occur for individual with relatively low commuting costs. For example,
commuting times tend to be much less in smaller urban areas, but it seems that
retirement remains a prominent feature of life cycle labor supply in these settings
as well as larger urban areas. This being the case, we need to understand why
retirement occurs not only for an individual with a high value of ¯ h but also for
those individuals with low values of ¯ h. From this perspective we may want to
evaluate equation (3.7) using a value of ¯ h much lower than the average value of
time spent commuting.
Second, although commuting costs are often mentioned as the classic example
of a ﬁxed cost, how they should be interpreted here depends very much on how
one interprets a period. If one interprets a period to be a day, then commuting
costs are clearly a ﬁxed cost. If one interprets a period as a week, one might think
17that commuting costs are a step function of weekly hours, with the potential
length of working days determining the length of the steps. In this case, marginal
adjustments in working hours, say by 1%, would typically represent adjustments
inside one of the steps, so that it again seems reasonable to think of commuting
costs as ﬁxed costs. But if one thinks of the period as a year, then an individual
could adjust annual hours by 1% or even less by changing the number of days
worked. If this is the margin of adjustment then commuting costs would be a
proportional cost not a ﬁxed cost.
Prescott et al (2009) argued that the ﬁxed costs in this speciﬁcation were
intended to capture set-up costs that a worker experiences at work. Even without
taking a strong stand on the appropriate level of setup costs, the results in Table
4 clearly suggest a tension. If one considers values of the IES that are .25 and
below, it seems very hard to rationalize the level of ﬁxed time costs required to
generate retirement since the implication is that over two thirds of the individual’s
time is devoted to set-up costs. This tension has implicitly appeared in empirical
work on labor supply. French (2005) estimates a life cycle model of labor supply
that includes accounting for retirement, and assumes ﬁx e dt i m ec o s t s .W h e nh e
estimates this speciﬁcation he ﬁnds a relatively small intertemporal elasticity of
substitution for labor, but a very large value of the ﬁx e dt i m ec o s t s .I nf a c t ,h i s
estimate of the ﬁxed time cost using annual data is more than 1200 hours per
year. While this is the value that is required to make the model consistent with
the data, this value seems hard to justify. In the next subsection we consider an
alternative formulation which provides a somewhat sharper comparison with the
18data.
3.2. An Alternative Formulation
The previous subsection assumed that the nonconvexity took the form of a ﬁxed
time cost. Whether this time cost reﬂects time getting to and from work or time
getting set up at work, it necessarily induces a nonconvex relationship between
the hours of leisure that the individual gives up and the earnings per hour of
leisure sacriﬁced. In this section we consider another form for this relationship.
Speciﬁcally, we assume that the individual faces a nonlinear wage schedule for the
wage per unit of time as a function of time spent working in a particular period.
In particular we assume that the wage schedule w(h) is given by:
w(h)=w0h
θ (3.10)
where θ ≥ 0.I f θ =0this reduces to the standard case in which the wage per
unit of time worked is independent of the number of hours worked, and implies a
convex budget set. The advantage of this speciﬁcation is that there has been some
empirical work to guide us in thinking about reasonable values of the parameter
θ. (See, for example, Moﬃtt (1984), Keane and Wolpin (2001) and Aaronson and
French (2004).) While there are some important issues involved in estimating this
parameter and there is by no means a deﬁnitive estimate, the value suggested by
this work is θ = .4. This is the value that French (2005) assumed when considering
this speciﬁcation. In this section we consider this alternative formulation and
solve for the value of θ that is required to generate retirement as a function of the
19preference parameter γ and the time devoted to work when working.




1+θ + Y )+ev(1 − h)+( 1− e)v(1) (3.11)












which now gives us a required value of θ given values for γ and h. The results are
contained in Table 5.
Table 5
Value of θ Required for Retirement
IES=2.0 IES=1.0 IES=.75 IES=.50 IES=.25 IES=.10 IES=.05
.22 .46 .64 1.04 2.53 8.19 18.2
The qualitative pattern is the same as that found in Table 4: the smaller the
IES the larger the nonconvexity needs to be in order to generate retirement as
part of an optimal choice for the individual. If we take the value of θ = .4 as a
guideline for a reasonable magnitude, we see that any values of the IES that are
.75 or below are not consistent with retirement given this degree of nonconvexity.
Subject to the issues raised earlier about commuting time, one might want to
allow for a ﬁxed time cost associated with getting to and from work in addition
to the nonlinear wage schedule that applies to hours at work. It is easy to assess
20how this aﬀects the numbers in Table 5. If one assumes a ﬁx e dt i m ec o s to f¯ h in
addition to the nonlinear wage schedule, so that only h−¯ h hours are productive,
one obtains the following expression:











Assuming that commuting costs represent 10% of total working time, the new
values of θ are given in Table 6.
Table 6
Value of θ Required for Retirement When ¯ h = .1h
IES=2.0 IES=1.0 IES=.75 IES=.50 IES=.25 IES=.10 IES=.05
.09 .31 .48 .84 2.17 7.27 16.3
W h i l et h i sa d j u s t m e n td o e si n ﬂuence the magnitude of the required values of θ,
the overall picture does not change much. There are three very diﬀerent potential
interpretations of the tradeoﬀ that these tables describe. If one wants to take
as given that the IES is .50 or smaller, and that θ is around .40,t h e nT a b l e s5
and 6 suggest that this model is not a good model of retirement, since it cannot
generate retirement for empirically reasonable parameters. Alternatively, if one
accepts this model as correct and assumes that θ = .4 is reasonable, we would
take this as evidence in support of a value for the IES that is either near to 1.0
or even slightly above 1.0. This value is much larger than many of the traditional
estimates derived from looking at changes in hours and wages for prime age males,
21and at the upper end of more recent estimates that challenge the earlier estimates.
Lastly, if we accept the model as correct and take a stand on the value of IES,
then the above table could be used to derive information about the value of θ.
Given these very diﬀerent potential interpretations, it is not possible to draw
any ﬁrm conclusions at this point as to whether this model can be viewed as an
empirically reasonable model of retirement. In the next section we show that
more deﬁnitive conclusions emerge when we extend the model to allow for home
production. But before considering that extension we ﬁrst note the implications
of the current model for the response of retirement to changes in the marginal
eﬀective tax rate.
3.3. Tax Eﬀects
One of the reasons for wanting to assess the extent to which models featuring non-
convexities in production represent empirically reasonable models of retirement is
that they have a very sharp prediction for the response of retirement to changes
in marginal tax rates. In this section we derive this implication. The main result
derived here is essentially contained in Prescott et al (2009), but we include it
here for completeness, since it will serve as a benchmark for extensions in the
next section. Consider a very simple and stylized social security system with the
following features. An individual pays a ﬂat tax of τ o nh i so rh e rl a b o re a r n i n g s .
The individual receives beneﬁts later in life that are a function of his or her total
tax paid into the system. Total tax paid into the system will equal τe(h−¯ h)1+θw0.
(Recall that we have assumed zero interest rates to simplify the analysis, so the
22aggregate tax paid is also the present value of taxes paid.) Because we assume
perfect capital markets, all that matters to the individual is the present value
of the total transfer, and not the timing of the transfer. Consider the following
simple speciﬁcation of the formula that determines the transfer payment:
T(τe(h − ¯ h)
1+θw0)=B0 + B1τe(h − ¯ h)
1+θw0 (3.14)
where B0 ≥ 0 and 0 ≤ B1 ≤ 1. The individual will take the parameters B0 and B1
as ﬁxed when making his or her labor supply decision. If B0 =0and B1 =1then
social security is a pure forced saving program, and given that we have assumed
that there are perfect markets for borrowing and lending, this system will have no
impact on individual choices. The lost income on the left-hand side of the budget
equation is exactly oﬀset by the increased income on the right hand side of the
budget equation, and the individual understands that each dollar paid in taxes
will be returned to them. But if B1 < 1 then the marginal increase in beneﬁts
is less than the marginal increase in taxes from the perspective of the individual,
independently of the value of B0. To simplify analysis we will assume that in
equilibrium the system is individually fair, in the sense that in equilibrium the
present value of the transfer received by this individual is the same as the present
value of taxes paid. This requires that the value of B0 is set just right.8 In this
case the eﬀect of the system is equivalent to what would be generated by having
a ﬂat tax on labor income of (1 − B1)τ with these funds being used to fund a
8If there is heterogeneity among individuals this condition could only hold on average, so this
analysis should be understood as reﬂecting the eﬀects on such an average person.
23lump-sum transfer that from the individual’s perspective is independent of his or
her choices. Loosely speaking, the distortion implied by the system is what is left
after we take out the forced saving component. We will call (1−B1)τ the eﬀective
marginal tax rate for this individual and denote it by τe
In what follows we consider changes in the social security system that change
the eﬀective marginal tax rate. This change may come from changes in the beneﬁt
formula or changes in the tax rate, or some combination thereof.9 For convenience
set nonlabor income equal to zero. The optimization problem that an individual




e)e(h − ¯ h)
1+θw0 + B0)+ev(1 − h)+( 1− e)v(1) (3.15)
where we assume that B0 is set so that at the optimal choices of the individual,
B0 = τee(h − ¯ h)1+θw0. Proceeding exactly as before, and assuming an interior
solution we obtain ﬁrst order conditions for e and h given by:
(1 − τe)(h − ¯ h)1+θw0
(1 − τ)ee(h − ¯ h)1+θw0 + B0
= v(1) − v(1 − h) (3.16)
(1 − τe)(1 + θ)(h − ¯ h)θw0
(1 − τe)e(h − ¯ h)1+θw0 + B0
= v
0(1 − h) (3.17)
Dividing these two equations by each other we obtain:
h − ¯ h =( 1+θ)
v(1) − v(1 − h)
v0(1 − h)
(3.18)
9When we do this we are implicitly assuming that the value of a is changed simultaneously
to eliminate any income eﬀect associated with the change in the system.
24which is the same expression that we derived earlier, implying that changes in
the eﬀe c t i v et a xr a t eh a v en oe ﬀect on how much people work while employed.
But making use of the balanced budget condition, we can rewrite the ﬁrst order
condition for h as :
e =( 1− τ
e)
1+θ
(h − ¯ h)v0(1 − h)
(3.19)
Given that h is independent of τe, it follows that e, and hence total labor sup-
ply, responds with a unitary elasticity to changes in (1 − τe). In particular,
independently of the curvature in the function v(1−h) and independently of the
magnitude of the ﬁxed cost, this model features a large change in retirement in re-
sponse to changes in eﬀective tax rates. So while we have raised issues concerning
the relationship between the required nonconvexity and the degree of curvature
in v(1−h), conditional on the model generating retirement, the responsiveness of
retirement to changes in eﬀective tax rates is independent of these details.
3.4. Sensitivity Analysis
Before moving on to the extension including home production, we assess the extent
to which some of the special features assumed above are inﬂuencing the quanti-
tative results that we derived. The ﬁr s ti s s u ew ec o n s i d e rh a st od ow i t ht h e
assumption that there are no age eﬀects on either wages or utility from leisure.
The second issue that we consider has to do with separability between consump-
tion and leisure. We deal with each in turn.
Adding age varying wages or utility does not matter at all for the results
derived above if we assume that these proﬁles are continuous. We demonstrate
25this in the context of an age varying utility from leisure, given by α(t). Consistent
with our desire to focus on retirement, i.e., that the period of not working in the
market occurs at the end of life, we assume that the α(t) proﬁle is increasing.10
It is no longer the case that hours of work when working are constant, so we will
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Assuming an interior solution the ﬁrst order condition for e is:
w(h(e) − ¯ h) R e
0 w(h(t) − ¯ h)dt + Y
= α(e)v(1) − α(e)v(1 − h(e)) (3.21)
Of particular interest is the ﬁrst order condition for the optimal level of hours at
the time of retirement, h(e).T h eﬁrst order condition for this value is:
w R e
0 w(h(t) − ¯ h)dt + Y
= α(e)v
0(1 − h(e)) (3.22)
Dividing these two expressions gives:
h(e) − ¯ h =
v(1) − v(1 − h(e))
v0(1 − h(e))
(3.23)
It follows that our previous calculations all go through exactly, as long as we
understand that the level of hours that we use in the calculation refers to the
10In fact, our analysis would go through unchanged if we instead assumed that this proﬁle
were u-shaped, thereby potentially generating a period of nonwork at the beginning of life as
well.
26level of hours worked at the time of retirement. But with this one proviso, the
calculation is entirely unchanged.11
We can also extend this analysis to handle the case of a single discontinuity
in the α proﬁle. If retirement occurs at the point of the discontinuity then what
matters is not what the hours were just prior to retirement, but rather what the
hours worked would have been at e had the individual not retired. The ﬁrst order
condition for optimal hours tells us that this value must satisfy
α(e)v
0(1 − h(e)) = lim
t→eα(t)v
0(1 − h(t)) (3.24)
The discontinuity in the α proﬁle can reduce the needed nonconvexity through
lowering the appropriate h to feed into the calculations. Basically, the implied
level of hours is the value that equates marginal disutility of work at the margin
with those periods in which the individual chose to work. However, as we know
from our earlier calculations, for relatively small elasticities the eﬀect of even
moderate discontinuities on h is somewhat small, and moreover the eﬀect of a
small change in h on the required nonconvexity is also small. We conclude that
the previous calculations are not much aﬀected by allowing for time changing α
or w, unless we allow for very large discontinuities.
The second sensitivity analysis that we consider is whether separability be-
tween consumption and leisure matters. To explore this we consider a period
11Rogerson and Wallenius (2009) assume that productivity varies with age, but do not target
working time at retirement in their calibration, so this result does not apply to their calculations.







In the limit as σ goes to one this period utility function converges to the additive
log speciﬁcation, which would correspond to an IES for labor of 1.22 in our earlier
analysis. We consider the results for the case where the only nonconvexity is due
to the presence of ﬁxed time costs, denoted by ¯ h. The results for the other cases
are similar, so we do not report them. Although we did not report results for
this particular value of γ,t h ev a l u eo f¯ h required to induce retirement assuming
h = .45 when working is equal to .13.
With non-separable preferences consumption will be diﬀerent when working
and when retired, so an optimal solution to the individual’s problem will now be
described by four values: e, h, cw,a n dcr,w h e r ee and h are as before, and the two
values cw and cr are consumption when working and when retired, respectively.
Unfortunately, with nonseparable preferences it is not possible to derive a simple
analytic expression that tells us the required degree of nonconvexity in order to
generate retirement. Instead we must resort to a numerical analysis. In what
follows we consider diﬀerent values of σ, and then for each value of σ we ﬁnd
values of φ and ¯ h that lead to optimal solutions for h and e equal to .45 and
2/3 respectively. In the separable case we found that the degree of nonconvexity
required was independent of what fraction of life was spent in employment as long
as the fraction was less than one. While that result no longer holds exactly, it
remains true approximately, so the choice of a target for e turns out not to be
28very important. Nonetheless, we note that e =2 /3 is a reasonable target in that
it corresponds to an individual having 60 y e a r sa sa na d u l ta n ds p e n d i n g40 of
them in employment, and this is the value that we use in the calculations.
Results are reported in Table 6. In addition to reporting the required level
of ¯ h, we also report the value of φ and the ratio of consumption when retired to
consumption when working.
Table 6
Results with Nonseparable Utility
σ ¯ hφc r/cw
2.00 .17 .270 .71
1.50 .15 .280 .83
1.25 .14 .285 .90
The results show that assuming nonseparability between leisure and consump-
tion tends to somewhat increase the degree of nonconvexity required to generate
retirement. We have only presented results for the case in which σ is larger than
one, since this leads to higher consumption when working than when retired,
which is consistent with what is observed in the data. Given that the magnitude
of the drop in consumption at retirement is on the order of 15% (see Laitner and
Silverman (2005)), this suggests that a value of σ between 1.25 and 1.50 would
be most reasonable. This increases the needed value of ¯ h by roughly 10%.W e
conclude that nonseparabilities do not have a very large impact on the previous
calculations, and that to the extent that they do, their eﬀect is to increase the
needed degree of nonconvexity.
294. Home Production and Retirement
In this section we extend the previous analysis to include home production. There
are several motivations for this extension. First, work by Aguiar and Hurst (2005)
has emphasized that home production may play an important role in understand-
ing the behavior of consumption at retirement. Second, if it is the case that
households substitute at least partially from market work into home production
a tr e t i r e m e n t ,i tf o l l o w st h a tt h ec h a n g ei nl e i s u r ew i l ln o tb ea sl a r g e ,a n dt h i s
will potentially inﬂuence the nonconvexities that are needed to induce retirement.
Third, broadening the analysis to include home production will allow us to as-
sess the basic model’s implications for a wider range of predictions, and therefore
potentially shed more light on the empirical importance of the mechanisms that
this model stresses. In particular, it may help us distinguish between the three
diﬀerent conclusions noted in the previous section.
4.1. Model
To maintain transparency we will return to the assumption of separability between
leisure and consumption and no age eﬀects. In the spirit of Becker (1965) we model
home production by assuming that the consumption that individuals care about
i sa na g g r e g a t eo fm a r k e tp u r c h a s e dg o o d sa n dt i m e .W ea s s u m et h a tg o o d sa n d
home production time are aggregated according to a CES aggregator:
c(t)=[ ag(t)
ε +( 1− a)hn(t)
ε]
1/ε. (4.1)
30In the spirit of Gronau (1977) we distinguish between leisure and working time
and assume that lifetime utility is given by:
Z 1
0
[logc(t)+v(1 − hm(t) − hn(t))]dt (4.2)






w0[hm(t) − ¯ h]
1+θdt (4.3)
where for simplicity we have dropped the non-labor income term. The optimal
solution can now be described by 6 numbers: e, hm, hw, hr, gw,a n dgr. As before,
e is the fraction of life spent in employment, and hm is the time spent working
in the market when working. The values gw and gr represent the consumption of
market goods when working and retired, respectively, and the values hw and hr
represent time spent in home production when working and retired, respectively.
4.2. Solution
Let μ be the multiplier on the budget equation, and deﬁne cw and cr as follows:
cw = ag
ε





r +( 1− a)h
ε
r (4.5)























= A(1 − hr)
− 1
γ (4.9)
hm : A(1 − hm − hw)
− 1
















γ = μ[gr−gw−(hm−¯ h)
1+θ]
(4.11)
plus the budget equation:
egw +( 1− e)gr = e(h − ¯ h)
1+θ (4.12)
Unfortunately, one cannot obtain simple analytic expressions like those we
derived in the earlier models to describe the extent of nonconvexities required
to generate retirement given targets for hours of work at the time of retirement.
As a result, we proceed in the next subsection to obtain results from numerical
analysis.
4.3. Results
The above model has six parameters: a, ε, A,/ γ, θ,a n d¯ h. We set ¯ h = .045
and will assess the additional required nonconvexity in terms of the value of θ.
32There are two elasticity parameters: ε and γ. As before, we will be interested
in exploring the relationship between elasticity parameters and the level of non-
convexities required to generate retirement, so we will consider various values for
each of these parameters. Given choices for ¯ h, γ,a n dε, we solve for values of the
other three parameters that are consistent with three targets that describe labor
allocations: the level of market work when working (hm), the length of life spent
in employment (e), and the amount of time devoted to home production when
working (hw). The three target values are hm = .45, hw = .10,a n de =2 /3.12
In the earlier analysis without home production we noted that the length of time
spent in employment prior to retirement had no impact on the level of nonconvex-
ity needed to generate retirement, given a level of work at the time of retirement.
This sharp result does not hold in the model with home production. However, it is
approximately true, so that our results about the degree of nonconvexity required
is not sensitive to our target for e.
Before presenting the results it is important to note that the implication of a
given value of γ for the implied intertemporal elasticity of substitution of labor
is not constant across models with and without home production. As previously
noted, the mapping from the intertemporal elasticity of substitution for leisure to
the intertemporal elasticity of substitution for labor is determined by the ratio
of working time to leisure time. Holding time devoted to market work constant
12T h ec h o i c eo fhw = .10 is perhaps a bit on the low side. According to the ATUS, home
production time for working male head of households in their late ﬁfties would correspond to .14
of their total discretionary time endowment. We choose a somewhat lower value to allow for the
possibility that this may include some part-time workers with higher values for home production
time. The results that we emphasize become even starker if we assume a higher value of home
production time, so in this sense our choice is conservative.
33but increasing the time devoted to home production necessarily decreases the
time devoted to leisure and so changes this mapping. Given that we target home
production time of .10 when the individual is working, it follows that the ratio of
w o r k i n gt i m et ol e i s u r et i m ei sn o w.55/.45, as opposed to .45/.55 in the earlier
analysis. We use this new ratio to determine the appropriate value of γ to represent
ag i v e nv a l u eo ft h eIES for labor. Table 7 provides the mapping from the IES
for labor into the values of γ that we use.
Table 7
Implied Values of γ for Given IES for Labor
IES=2.0 IES=1.0 IES=.75 IES=.50 IES=.25 IES=.10 IES=.05
2.44 1.22 .92 .61 .31 .12 .06
For each of the values of γ given above, we consider values of ε ranging from 0
to .40, implying an elasticity of substitution between goods and time varying from
1 to 1.67. The existing empirical literature suggests that values as high as 2.5 are
reasonable, but as we will see below, values this high do not seem reasonable in
the context of this model, so we only report results for an elasticity as high as
1.67.13
Table 8 reports the implied values for the parameter θ. For ease of comparison
the ﬁnal column of this table repeats the values from the earlier calculations that
13Using aggregate data, McGrattan, Rogerson and Wright (1997) ﬁnd a value of ε in the range
of .40 − .45, while Chang and Schorfheide (2003) ﬁnd a value in the range of .55 − .60.U s i n g
micro data, Rupert, Rogerson and Wright (1995) ﬁnd an estimate in the range .40 − .45, while
Aguiar and Hurst (2007a) report an estimate for their benchmark speciﬁcation in the range of
.50 − .60.
34did not include home production.
Table 8
Values of θ for Home Production Model
ε =0 ε = .20 ε = .40 w/o HP
IES =1 .00 .18 .17 .16 .31
IES = .50 .41 .38 .34 .84
IES = .25 .70 .63 .52 2.17
IES = .10 1.03 .86 .70 7.27
Extending the analysis to allow for home production has quite substantial
implications for the degree of nonconvexity that is required in order to generate
retirement. In particular, consider the case where the IES is equal to .10.I n
the model without home production, the required value of θ was over 7.W i t h
ε = .40 this value is now reduced to .70, which is an order of magnitude smaller.
Similarly, with the IES of .25 and ε = .40 one can generate retirement with values
of θ that are not too much larger than current estimates, whereas previously this
case required a value of θ greater than 2.
Two additional statistics are also of interest. Our procedure does not target
the amount of time devoted to home production during retirement. This value is
implicitly determined as part of the calibration procedure that chooses values of
a, A,a n dθ to match the three targets. And although preferences are separable
between consumption and leisure, the presence of a home production margin im-
plies that consumption of goods need not be the same during working years as
during retirement. Table 9 displays the results for hr and gr/gw.
35Table 9
Values of hr and gr/gw i nt h eH o m eP r o d u c t i o nM o d e l
hr gr/gw
ε =0 ε = .2 ε = .4 ε =0 ε = .2 ε = .4
IES =1 .00 .23 .23 .24 1.00 .96 .90
IES = .50 .24 .26 .29 1.00 .93 .83
IES = .25 .35 .37 .39 1.00 .89 .76
IES = .10 .46 .47 .48 1.00 .86 .70
We begin by discussing the results for the drop in consumption of goods at
retirement. As expected, the drop in consumption of goods at retirement is in-
creasing in the value of ε. Intuitively, since time becomes relatively more plentiful
during retirement, the individual substitutes time for goods when moving from
working to retirement. The greater the degree of substitutability, the greater is
this eﬀect. But while the qualitative eﬀect is intuitive and expected, Table 9 shows
that its magnitude can be quite large. In particular, for low values of the IES
a n dh i g hv a l u e so fε, the drop can be as much as 30%. As noted earlier, the drop
in consumption of goods at retirement is estimated to be in the neighborhood
of 15%. Allowing for nonseparability would induce an additional channel though
which consumption of goods would drop at retirement. It therefore seems that
any speciﬁcation yielding a value of gr/gw less than .85 should be viewed as empir-
ically unreasonable. Given the model, this would imply that either ε is no larger
than .2 or that the IES must be above .5. In particular, although this model can
reconcile low values of the IES with reasonable degrees of nonconvexity, these
36speciﬁcations have counterfactual implications along other dimensions.
Next we consider the model’s implications for time devoted to home produc-
tion in retirement. At the beginning of this section we argued that it may be
easier to generate retirement in a model with home production if retirement is
associated with a substitution from market work to both home production and
leisure. Intuitively, this substitution into home production decreases the extent of
the jump in leisure associated with retirement, thereby decreasing the extent of
the nonconvexity required to generate retirement. This intuition suggests that the
assumed increase in home production time at retirement plays a key role. How-
ever, as just noted, our procedure does not assume a level of home production
time in retirement. Instead, it determines the level of home production time in
retirement that is consistent with the time allocation during employment. And
what our results imply is that if one is able to generate retirement in this model,
which necessarily implies a large change in market work, then it is necessarily the
c a s et h a tt h e r em u s tb eal a r g ei n c r e a s ei nt i m ed e v o t e dt oh o m ep r o d u c t i o n .T h e
intuition for this result is as follows. If it is optimal for an individual to devote
a particular amount of time to home production when they are doing a lot of
market work and have little leisure, then the incentive to do home production
when market work drops to zero necessarily becomes very large. As our calcu-
lations show, time devoted to home production more than doubles, even if we
assume that ε =0and the IES is equal to 1. Although we did not report it in
the table, this continues to be the case even for the case when the IES is equal
to 2. At the other extreme, if the IES is equal to .10 the model requires that
37retirement basically constitutes a switch from full time market work to full time
home production.
Another way to summarize the change in time allocation associated with re-
tirement is to ask what fraction of the drop in market work is allocated to leisure.
When the IES is equal to 1.0, roughly three quarters of the drop in market work
goes into leisure. When the IES is equal to .50 this fraction drops to around
two-thirds, and when the IES is .25 this value is about two-ﬁfths. When the
IES drops to .10 the increase in leisure is only about one ﬁfth of the decrease
in market work. When the IES is small, the individual has a strong preference
for smooth leisure, and the result is that an optimal allocation involves a proﬁle
for home production that yields a relatively smooth path for leisure in the face of
large changes in the amount of time devoted to market work. In the next section
we will present data on the extent of changes in time allocation associated with
retirement.
4.4. Tax Eﬀects
In this subsection we reconsider the same tax policies as were considered in the
model without home production to see whether the extension to include home
production has signiﬁcant eﬀects on the previous results. For this model it is
necessary to resort to numerical analysis. Table 10 presents results of an increase
in the eﬀective marginal tax rate of 5% for a few diﬀerent speciﬁcations.
38Table 10
Eﬀect of 5% Increase in τe
IES = .25 IES =1 .00
ε =0 ε = .40 ε =0 ε = .40
∆loge −.05 −.09 −.05 −.07
∆logh. 00 .00 .00 .00
∆loghw .00 .01 .00 .02
∆loghr .00 .01 .00 .02
We begin by noting a couple of patterns that hold for both values of the IES.
First, if ε =0the table shows that the results for market work are eﬀectively
identical to those from the model without home production: all labor supply
adjustment occurs along the employment margin, and the response in log hours is
basically one for one with changes in the tax rate. The fact that home production
eﬀectively does not matter when ε =0has previously been obtained in home
production models without nonconvexities in production (see, e.g., Benhabib et al
(1991)), so this result is perhaps not surprising. But perhaps somewhat surprising
i st h ef a c tt h a te v e nw h e nε = .40, indicating quite a lot of substitutability
between goods and time, it remains true that there is no adjustment of market
hours while employed. Perhaps somewhat surprisingly, this occurs even though
there is an increase in time devoted to home production when working. Although
the overall eﬀect of the tax increase is to increase the amount of leisure enjoyed
over the lifetime, the amount of leisure enjoyed decreases both when working and
when retired. The increase in leisure occurs because a greater fraction of life
39is spent in retirement, and the individual has greater leisure when retired than
when working in the market. Similarly, there is a substitution from market work
to home production over the lifetime of the individual, but not at each point in
life, since there is no reduction of time devoted to market work while employed.
Finally, note that when ε = .40 the response of retirement is signiﬁcantly larger
than when ε =0 .
Next we compare the responses across the two diﬀerent values of the IES.
Given the earlier comments, it is not surprising that when ε =0there is no
diﬀerence across the cases, since this is what we found analytically for the model
without home production. But when ε = .40 t h er e s p o n s ei nm a r k e tw o r ki s
greater when the IES is smaller. While at ﬁrst pass this seems surprising, a closer
l o o kr e v e a l st h a tt h i sr e s u l tn e e d st ob ei n t e r p r e t e dc a r e f u l l y .A so n em i g h te x p e c t ,
the model with a higher IES has greater adjustment along the intensive margin,
i.e., home production time increases more both when working and not working. It
follows that the change in employment is misleading in terms of telling us about
the change in leisure. A closer analysis reveals that leisure increases by more in
t h ec a s ew i t hah i g h e rI E S .
To summarize, the model with home production also predicts that all adjust-
ment of market work to increases in the eﬀective marginal tax rate will take place
along the employment margin. If the value of ε is greater than zero, then this re-
sponse is greater than that in the model without home production, implying that
the response in log employment responds more than one for one with changes in
tax rates.
405. A Look at the Time Use Data
In this section we analyze data from the ATUS to assess how time allocations
change when individuals retire. Ideally we would like to have panel data in order
to see how a given individual or household changes their time use following retire-
ment. Unfortunately, such data does not exist. Absent panel data, one alternative
w o u l db et oc o m p a r et h et i m eu s ea l l o c a t i o n sb e t w e e nw o r k e r sa n dn o n - w o r k e r s
of a given age. But looking at a given cross section of workers and non-workers
has the potential to be very misleading. For example, it turns out that among
individuals aged 55-60, non-workers devote much more time to home production
than do workers. However, we cannot tell if the nonworkers have always spent
more time in home production, or if they increased the amount of time spent in
home production because they are not working. Or put somewhat diﬀerently, it
m a yw e l lb et h a tt h er e a s o nt h e yd on o tw o r ki nt h em a r k e ti sb e c a u s et h e ys p e n d
a lot of time in home production, rather than the reverse. The same issue would
also naturally arise in considering diﬀerences in leisure time: observing that a
p e r s o nw h oi sn o tw o r k i n ge n j o y sm o r el e i s u r ed o e sn o ta l l o wu st od e t e r m i n et h e
extent to which his or her leisure increased on account of moving from working to
not working.
Instead, we take advantage of the fact that there is a dramatic decrease in
average market work between the ages of 55 and 70, with most of this drop asso-
ciated with retirement. By examining the change in average time use allocations
over this age range we can hopefully isolate the average response in time devoted
to various uses associated with retirement. Looking at what happens to changes
41in average time allocations across age avoids the selection problems noted above if
it is reasonable to assume that retirement is the dominant source of changes over
the age range considered. While it is certainly reasonable to think that there are
age eﬀects in addition to those associated with retirement, the change in market
work is suﬃciently large that we believe it is reasonable to think that retirement is
t h ed o m i n a n tf o r c e .W ec o m p u t ea v e r a g et i m ea l l o c a t i o n sb ya g eu s i n gd a t af r o m
the ATUS for the years 2003-2006, pooling data across the four samples. Tables
A1 and A2 in the appendix provide the data on average time allocations by age
for both the total sample and for men.
We summarize the relationships in the data in two diﬀerent ways, both of which
basically tell the same story. The ﬁrst method regresses time in each category on
a constant and age to measure the average change with age. The second method
regresses time devoted to each activity other than market work on a constant
and time devoted to market work, to isolate the change in each time use that is
correlated with changes in market work by age. The ﬁrst method imposes that
the eﬀects are linear in age, whereas the second method imposes that the eﬀects
are linear in the change in time devoted to market work. Results of both exercises
are reported in Table 11, based on time use data for all individuals aged 55-70.
The headings in the table have the following meaning: MW is market work, HP
is time spent in home production, SH is shopping time, LE is leisure time, ED is
time spent eating and drinking, and PC is time devoted to personal care.14
14We aggregate activities in the ATUS into these categories as follows. Personal care consists
of sleeping, grooming, health related self-care, personal activities and personal care emergen-
cies. Home production includes housework, food and drink prep, presentation and cleanup,
interior maintenance, repair and decoration, exterior repair, maintenance and decoration, lawn,
42Table 11
Estimated Time Use Eﬀects—Total (standard errors in parentheses)
Dep. Var. MW HP SH ED LE PC
Age -1.51(.09) .16(.04) .02(.02) .09(.02) 1.00(.06) .17(.04)
Market Work − -.12(.02) -.01(.01) -.06(.01) -.65(.04) -.12(.02)
The ﬁrst row documents the extent to which time use in the various categories
is either increasing or decreasing with age. It shows that market work is decreasing
at a strong rate, while everything else is tending to increase, with the exception
of shopping, which displays no trend. The regression coeﬃcient in the second
row gives the change in time allocated to each activity in response to a change in
market work of one hour. The key message of interest from this row is that for
each hour decrease in market work, leisure time increases by almost two-thirds of
an hour. Including time spent eating and drinking in the leisure category does not
change this estimate much. In contrast, this same one hour decrease in market
work leads to an increase in home production of slightly more than one tenth of
an hour. Including shopping time has eﬀectively no impact on this estimate.
These results are clearly of interest in terms of interpreting the results of the
previous section. None of the speciﬁcations that we examined there generate such
a low response of home hours to a decrease in market work. As we previously
garden and houseplants, animals and pets, vehicles, appliances, tools and toys, and household
management. Shopping includes consumer purchases, professional and personal care purchases,
purchasing household services, and purchasing government services. Leisure includes social-
izing and communicating, attending and hosting social events, relaxing and leisure, arts and
entertainment, and waiting associated with the above.
43discussed, any model that posits a desire for smooth leisure over time and even
very weak substitution between time and goods in home production produces a
sizable increase in time devoted to home production when there is a large drop in
hours devoted to market work. The previous section provided some guidance as to
the magnitude of these eﬀects. Viewed against the eﬀects that we have measured
in the ATUS, even the models with a large IES and a small value of ε generate
changes in time devoted to home production that are too large by almost an order
of magnitude.
T h ea b o v er e s u l t sw e r ef o rt h et o t a lp o p u l a t i o n . I fw ee x a m i n et h ed a t af o r
men only, then the picture looks even worse in terms of the model and the data.
Table 12 presents the results of the simple regression analysis for men.
Table 12
Estimated Time Use Eﬀects—Men (standard errors in parentheses)
Dep. Var. MW HP SH ED LE PC
Age -1.68(.15) .01(.01) .08(.03) .12(.03) 1.19(.09) .17(.04)
Market Work − -.03(.03) -.05(.02) -.07(.02) -.68(.04) -.11(.02)
The overall results for men are quite similar to those for the total population,
but note that the change in home production time is small and not signiﬁcantly
diﬀerent from zero. There is however, a small and statistically signiﬁcant increase
in shopping time. If one considers the point estimates, then the increase in home
production and shopping time amounts to less than one tenth of an hour for each
hour change in market work. The increase in leisure in response to a decrease in
44market work is once again around two-thirds.
To summarize, the key ﬁnding from the data is that we ﬁnd very little evidence
for substitution between market work and home production as part of retirement.
While the data we examine is not panel data and therefore is not ideally suited to
shedding light on this margin, the fact that home production time changes so little
as market work decreases so dramatically suggests that this ﬁnding is likely to be
robust. We believe that this ﬁnding casts doubt on any model which predicts a
large increase in home production associated with retirement.
5.1. Extending the Home Production Model
Having documented a very signiﬁcant discrepancy between data and theory it is
natural to ask if there are alterations to the basic model that would change this.
We believe the answer to this is no, but will postpone discussion of this point
until later in this section. Simply put, one might characterize the basic problem
from the previous analysis to be that time devoted to home production increases
by too much during retirement. It follows that adding features that would work
to decrease the extent of this increase would presumably decrease the discrepancy
between theory and data.
One simple and intuitive way to achieve this is to assume that the marginal
value of home production time diminishes very rapidly, thereby creating very little
incentive for high values of home production time. To capture this we assume that
the home production function is now written as:
c(t)=[ ag(t)
ε +( 1− a)hn(t)
ηε]
1/ε (5.1)
45where 0 <η≤ 1.I fη =1then this is simply the original model. One can interpret
hη
n as the eﬃciency units of home production, so that if η<1 the implication is
that the mapping from time devoted to home production into eﬃciency units of
home production time displays diminishing returns, and the smaller the value of
η the greater is the degree of diminishing returns. Consider repeating our earlier
procedure. We now have one additional parameter and so in principle could target
one more value, which could be hr. However, it turns out that one cannot target
an arbitrary value for hr. For example, even in the most favorable of our previous
cases, with the IES =1 .0 and ε =0 , setting η = .1 still yields a value of hr = .16.
While certainly diminished, the discrepancy is still quite large. On the other hand,
if we pick a small value of the IES,s a y ,.25,t h e nη has very little ability to aﬀect
the value of hr.I nt h i sc a s ee v e nw h e nη = .20,t h ev a l u eo fhr is still as high as
.34.
Of course, if one were to consider ﬂexible speciﬁcations that allow for diminish-
ing marginal productivity of home production time then one could easily engineer
whatever result is desired. All that one would need to do is to assume that the
marginal value of time spent in home production drops to zero at whatever the
target value is. So the failure of the above speciﬁcation to resolve the discrepancy
can be interpreted as a failure to allow for suﬃcient ﬂexibility in functional forms.
However, we argue that this type of solution to the discrepancy does not seem
promising. The reason is that a solution of this form will imply that there is
very little scope for substitution between time and goods beyond some relatively
low threshold. While this may do a good job of ﬁtting the facts in terms of
46what happens to home production time during retirement, this would seem to be
sharply at odds with the evidence about time devoted to home production during
other parts of the life cycle. We know from Aguiar and Hurst (2007b) and Francis
and Ramey (2009) that as women entered the workforce there was a large drop in
time devoted to home production. One still sees large diﬀerences in time devoted
to home production between households with two working members as opposed
to one working member. And cross country analysis has revealed quite large
substitution between home production and goods. See, for example, Freeman and
Schettkat (2001,2005), Davis and Henrekson (2004), Ragan (2005), and Burda,
Hamermesh and Weil (2008). This evidence does not seem to be consistent with
a theory that says there is very little scope for substitution. Reconciling these
observations would require a theory in which the home production function in
retirement is dramatically diﬀerent than it is prior to retirement. To us this does
not seem to be a promising solution.
6. Conclusion and Directions for Future Research
In order to understand the eﬀects of changes in retirement programs on retirement,
one needs to have a model of retirement that captures the key forces relevant for
this decision. Generating retirement seems to call for alterations to the standard
life cycle model in which preferences are time separable and strictly concave, and
budget sets are convex. The reason is that these models have strong motives for
individuals to smooth leisure over time, and this makes retirement an unattractive
option. Uncovering the empirically relevant departures from this framework that
47are important in generating retirement, and their implications for how individ-
uals respond to changes in programs such as social security and medicare is an
important research objective.
This paper has taken a ﬁr s ts t e pi nt h i sd i r e c t i o nb ye x a m i n i n gi ns o m ed e t a i l
one particular class of models that have been suggested as oﬀering a likely expla-
nation for retirement. This class of models maintains the assumption of strictly
concave and time separable utility, but posits nonconvexities in production that
lead to nonconvex budget sets. This class of models has very sharp implications
for the response of retirement to marginal changes in eﬀective tax rates. In partic-
ular, it predicts that the length of working life responds one-for-one with decreases
in the after tax return, which is a big eﬀect. It is thus quite important to assess
t h ee m p i r i c a lf o u n d a t i o n so ft h i sm o d e l .
In a version of this model without home production we show that the model’s
ability to account for retirement depends upon the relationship between two key
parameters: the degree of nonconvexity and the IES. Better measurement is
important to obtain sharper conclusions from this exercise. When we extend the
analysis to allow for home production, we ﬁnd a major discrepancy between this
theory and the data from the ATUS.
The main message that we take away from the preceding analysis is that models
in which individuals have a desire for smooth proﬁles of leisure and retirement is
the result of nonconvexities associated with production of output would do not
seem to present an adequate theory of retirement. Especially important is the
fact that if individuals have a desire for smooth proﬁles of leisure it is hard to
48understand why the time devoted to home production does not increase more
substantially at retirement. One possibility is that the returns to home production
display drop oﬀ very sharply as home production time is increased. But this seems
hard to reconcile with the fact that in diﬀerent circumstances we observe lots of
substitution between home and market consumption.
In this concluding section we would like to suggest that researchers (including
us) may have been looking in the wrong place for the nonconvexities that are
central to understanding the motives for retirement. In particular, it may be that
there are important nonconvexities associated with the enjoyment of leisure in
addition to those that are present in production. For example, certain leisure
activities are more diﬃcult to engage in when one is working, even if not full
time. An obvious example is travel. More subtle is the general fact that work
reduces one’s ﬂexibility in terms of scheduling activities. We leave a rigorous
examination of this possibility for future work, but here we want to describe
one simple speciﬁcation and discuss why we think it is a promising candidate to
address the problems noted earlier.
In the previous analysis we assumed that the utility from leisure in any given
period was given by v(1 − h) where h was total time devoted to work. What we
want to consider now is that there is one function, call it vW(1−h) that describes
the utility from leisure during a period when market work is positive, and there is
another function, call it vR(1−h), that describes the utility from leisure during a
period when market work is zero. One simple speciﬁcation of this sort would be:
v
N(1 − h)=D + v
W(1 − h)
49where D>0. This speciﬁcation says that there is some additional utility asso-
ciated with doing zero market work relative to doing an inﬁnitesimal amount of
market work, but that the marginal utility of leisure is unaﬀected. While such
as p e c i ﬁcation may seem reasonable, and for suﬃciently large values of D could
generate retirement in an otherwise standard model, it seems unlikely to resolve
the key discrepancy noted previously. In particular, this speciﬁcation would still
give rise to the incentives for substitution into home production following a large
decrease in work. However, an alternative speciﬁcation would be:
v
N(1 − h)=Dv
W(1 − h) (6.1)
where D>1. A simple implication of this speciﬁcation is that it is no longer
the case that the individual has a preference for smooth leisure over time. In
particular, if the individual has leisure equal to .5 in half the periods and leisure
equal to 1 in the other half of the periods, it is not the case that the individual
would be better oﬀ having leisure equal to .75 in all periods.
This speciﬁcation may also help to explain why it is that time devoted to
home production does not increase more during retirement. The reason is that
with D greater than one, the marginal value of leisure time increases at retirement,
thereby creating an incentive to take more leisure. Loosely speaking, this increased
marginal value of leisure has the potential to squeeze out some time that would
have been allocated to home production. Whether such a model will be able to
quantitatively account for the patterns we see in the time use data remains an
open question and one that we leave to future work.
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Time Use By Age: Men and Women
Age MW HP SH L E PC
55 23.51 6 .56 .03 5 .39 .16 5 .1
56 23.41 6 .75 .93 5 .59 .16 5 .5
57 24.31 5 .76 .63 6 .09 .16 4 .2
58 23.61 5 .55 .63 7 .38 .56 5 .2
59 20.61 6 .45 .53 9 .09 .46 5 .3
60 19.61 6 .06 .03 6 .61 0 .26 6 .3
61 18.61 6 .56 .23 9 .19 .56 6 .4
62 16.31 6 .65 .93 9 .59 .86 6 .3
63 13.41 7 .56 .14 2 .39 .76 6 .4
64 13.31 8 .46 .24 3 .99 .46 4 .9
65 8.00 18.95 .74 5 .59 .76 6 .5
66 7.55 18.26 .24 4 .01 0 .16 8 .2
67 7.64 18.16 .54 6 .81 0 .56 6 .5
68 8.25 17.45 .44 6 .89 .96 6 .6
69 4.57 18.36 .84 8 .21 0 .06 7 .5
70 3.78 17.46 .34 9 .71 0 .56 7 .5
71 4.36 17.45 .34 7 .41 1 .06 9 .0
72 5.67 18.56 .04 7 .61 0 .46 7 .1
56TableA2
Time Use By Age: Men
Age MW HP SH L E PC
55 26.41 4 .14 .73 7 .31 0 .06 4 .2
56 28.41 3 .44 .73 8 .09 .36 3 .0
57 26.11 3 .05 .73 8 .99 .46 3 .8
58 30.01 1 .45 .13 7 .88 .96 3 .1
59 26.11 5 .13 .94 0 .09 .46 3 .2
60 25.41 2 .45 .43 7 .91 1 .36 4 .6
61 21.41 3 .45 .04 2 .69 .96 5 .2
62 19.61 2 .74 .84 1 .91 0 .86 5 .2
63 14.81 4 .85 .14 4 .71 0 .46 5 .4
64 17.81 3 .15 .14 5 .71 0 .76 4 .6
65 11.11 3 .55 .25 0 .01 1 .06 5 .3
66 7.91 5 .35 .94 9 .01 0 .96 6 .5
67 9.21 3 .46 .65 2 .11 0 .36 4 .8
68 11.51 3 .25 .35 0 .31 0 .66 4 .4
69 6.01 3 .56 .95 2 .31 1 .36 5 .9
70 7.01 2 .45 .05 2 .71 1 .26 6 .3
71 6.21 3 .24 .35 0 .81 1 .76 7 .4
72 7.41 5 .26 .14 8 .91 1 .36 5 .7
57